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mask and carrying a sawed off shotgun entered the store and 
demanded money (T. 51-52). After receiving the money and putting 
it in a denim bag, the person left the store (T. 55, 76). 
Audrey Robinson, Appellant's sister, testified that her 
brother was at her home on August 21, 1988, and stayed there 
while Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus took the car to drive 
Genora home (T.2 48-50). 
After the robbery, Julie Lund saw the robber enter a 
white compact car with two women in it, and testified that she 
recognized one of the women in the car as a person who had been 
in the Payless store a few hours before the robbery (T. 78). 
Nanci Condi was in her car with her three children in 
the vicinity of the robbery on the day of the robbery, and she 
saw a man with something pink on his head who stuffed something 
into a bag and jumped into a white compact car (T. 86-88). Ms. 
Condi was unable to identify the man after the robbery because 
she never saw his face (T. 93). 
Officer Kory Newbold was on his way to investigate the 
robbery at the Payless shoe store, when he saw a vehicle with 
three occupants, who he thought were Mexicans (T. 115-116). The 
dispatch report indicated that the Payless store had been robbed 
by a male Mexican, so Officer Newbold signalled the car to pull 
over (T. 116). The driver of the car did not pull over, but 
drove on, temporarily losing Officer Newbold (T. 116). When 
Officer Newbold was able to stop the vehicle, he ordered the 
woman driving the car, which contained only the driver and one 
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other woman, to throw the keys out the car window, and ordered 
the two women to place their hands on the ceiling of the car (T. 
118). 
Officer Newbold explained to the driver of the car, who 
was crying, that he was looking for a suspect in an armed 
robbery, but when he saw that the occupants of the car were 
black, he explained that he was looking for a Mexican and 
apologized (T. 119). Upon returning to his car, Officer Newbold 
again pulled the car over because he received updated information 
from the dispatcher, which indicated that the suspect may have 
been black, and identified the vehicle that the suspect had 
jumped into (T. 119-120). The new dispatch information also 
indicated that the robber had put the money in a denim bag (T. 
119). Officer Newbold noticed a denim bag in the back seat of 
the automobile, and handcuffed the occupants of the car, Rosemary 
Mar and Genora Marcellus (T. 120). 
Scott Jones was driving in the vicinity of the arrest, 
and he saw a person wearing pants and a sweatshirt jump out of a 
white compact car, and then saw a police car pull the car over 
(T. 106-107). Mr. Jones drove around the neighborhood following 
the person he had seen jump out of the car (T. 107). Mr. Jones 
lost sight of the person for about twenty minutes, and spotted 
him again, after the person had changed from long pants and a 
shirt into shorts (T. 107). Mr. Jones then told Officer Newbold 
that he had seen a black male exiting the car prior to the arrest 
of the two women (T. 121). Mr. Jones equivocally identified as 
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the perpetrator a person other than Appellant at a line-up (T. 
109) . 
Ms. Condi and Ms. Lund were driven by a police officer 
to the scene of the arrest to identify the automobile that the 
robber jumped into (T. 92). 
The police retrieved a gun and a bag of money from 
children who had found them (T. 99# 104, 137, 140, 143). There 
were no legible prints on the gun (T.2 34). Two nylon stockings 
were seized from the car occupied by Ms. Marcellus and Ms. Mars, 
but the stockings contained no hair samples for the State Crime 
Laboratory to compare with Appellant's (T.2 34). 
Detective Ron Edwards of the West Valley Police 
department was called in to interview Rosemary Mar and Genora 
Marcellus (T. 148). He stated that after he read Ms. Mar her 
Miranda rights, she agreed to speak with him but would not allow 
the interview to be tape recorded (T. 149). According to 
Detective Edwards, Rosemary said that she and Genora and 
Appellant were in the car together at about 3:00 p.m., and that 
she and Rosemary went into Payless shoes, but were unable to find 
anything they wanted (T. 151). Detective Edwards said that after 
the women returned to the car, Appellant went into the shoe 
store, returning a few minutes later to inform them that he had 
just robbed the store (T. 151). The detective said that Rosemary 
said that when the police began following their car, she threw 
the money and gun out the window, and forced Appellant out of the 
car (T. 152). 
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Officer Edwards testified that he then interviewed 
Genora Marcellus, again without tape recording the interview at 
the witness1 request (T. 153). The detective said that Genora's 
version of the events was similar to Ms. Mar's (T. 154). 
Neither Rosemary nor Genora testified at trial. 
Detective Edwards testified that he interviewed 
Appellant on August 22, 1988, the day after the robbery (T. 157). 
Officers Carter and Sullivan were present during the interview, 
which, he testified, was not recorded at Appellant's request (T. 
158). Officer Edwards stated that Appellant claimed to be 
innocent at the beginning of the interview, but that after 
Officers Carter and Sullivan were excused (at Appellant's 
request), the following transpired: 
After the two other officers left the room I 
asked him point blank, did you do the 
robbery? He said, What's in it for me? I 
said, I can't give you any promises. 
Everything's going to have to go through the 
county attorney's office. He stated, I don't 
want Rosemary charged. I says, I still 
cannot give you a guarantee. I said, that's 
up to the county attorney's office about 
that. He stated, Yes, I did it. I said, 
will you explain to me how you did it. He 
says that they were at his sister's place, 
Audrey's on Sunday afternoon. They left the 
house in her car. They were going west. 
That Rosemary wanted him to do the robbery. 
It was his girlfriend. That they went out to 
the Payless Shoe on 5600 West 3500 South. He 
had the two girls go in to look at the 
building, the Payless Shoes, how many girls 
were there, where the safe was and the 
diagram of the place, more or less, at which 
time they came out, then he went in and 
robbed them. 
He stated he had a shotgun, that he put 
the mask over his head. He went in there 
with the shotgun. He stated at that time 
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that it wasn't loaded, that he didn't want to 
hurt anybody. He said he went in there, had 
forced one woman down, he took the other 
woman back to the safe and to the till, put 
the money in a denim bag and ran out. 
He said he got in the car; they took 
off. As he went down one of the streets they 
said a West Valley officer turned around on 
'em; they tried to evade him. He jumped out 
at that time. 
He says that Rosemary threw the gun and 
the money out of the car. He went into the 
bushes in a field, did a semi circle and 
watched the officers there from across the 
street in the weeds. 
After the vehicle was impounded and 
everybody left he then started to hitchhike. 
A gentleman in an older pickup picked him up, 
took him up on Redwood Road. He stated that 
he was home — well, he was with his sister, 
Audrey, at the time when I called Audrey 
about 8:00 o'clock on the night before, that 
he was at his sister's residence. 
(T. 159-160). 
Officer Scott Carver testified that he was present when 
the interrogation of Appellant began, and stated that after he 
and Officer Sullivan left Appellant with Detective Edwards, he 
saw Appellant, who told him "I told 'em I did it so they would 
let Rosemary go." (T.2 43). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court violated Appellant's right to due 
process under the federal constitution by admitting into evidence 
the in court identification of Appellant by the only eyewitness 
who testified, Micki Horn. This in court identification was the 
product of the suggestion that Appellant was the perpetrator 
provided by Appellant's sitting at the defendant's table at 
trial, rather than the product of Ms. Horn's independent 
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recollection of the robbery. At the robbery, Ms. Horn had 
inadequate opportunity to observe the masked robber, and was 
under extreme stress. Her description of him was vague, and she 
failed to identify Appellant as the perpetrator in the line-up 
she attended. She also failed to select Appellant from a 
photograph of the line-up after she made a definite 
identification of Appellant in court. Ms. Horn's in court 
identification of Appellant came months after the robbery, and 
months after the pretrial line-up, at which she failed to 
identify Appellant. The trial court's failure to suppress the in 
court identification thus violated Appellant's rights to due 
process. Inasmuch as the other evidence linking Appellant to the 
crime was inadmissible and/or weak, the court's admission of the 
in court identification was prejudicial error. 
The trial court violated Appellant's rights to 
Confrontation under the Utah and federal constitution by 
admitting the hearsay statements of Rosemary Mar and Genora 
Marcellus. The court abused its discretion in finding these 
witnesses unavailable, in the absence of the state's proof that a 
good faith effort had been made to find each witness. 
Furthermore, the court erred in admitting the statements into 
evidence as statements against penal interest, because the 
statements, as confessions of accomplices, should have been 
presumed unreliable. Although the statements interlocked with 
Appellant's alleged confession, the circumstances surrounding the 
State's obtaining the statements from Appellant, Ms. Mar and Ms. 
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Marcellus preclude a finding that the hearsay statements were 
reliable. This violation of Appellant's rights to confrontation 
was prejudicial error because of the interlocking nature of the 
confessions, and because of the paucity of other evidence 
supporting Appellant's conviction. 
The trial court violated Appellant's rights provided in 
the Double Jeopardy clauses of the Utah and federal constitutions 
by imposing a firearm enhancement, because Appellant's sentence 
for aggravated robbery was already elevated to account for the 
use of a firearm. 
I. 
IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS THE 
IN COURT IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT, 
THE COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 
Ms. Horn, who was working at the Payless Store during 
the robbery testified that she got a good look at the masked 
robber (T. 55). On September 29, 1988, she attended a line-up in 
which Appellant was included, at which time she equivocally 
identified a person other than Appellant as the perpetrator (T. 
56). Over objection, the court allowed Ms. Horn to identify 
Appellant in court, stating the conditions to testimony, without 
investigating them further: "If she has any independent 
recollection she can testify to it." (T. 57). Ms. Horn made this 
in-court identification of Appellant: 
Well, when I walked in I sat down and he 
turned around and it hit me like a ton of 
bricks. I recognized him. And that was it. 
And everything about him — the features — I 
just ... it was him. I just couldn't — I 
don't know. But I recognized him. The way 
he moved, the way his back was over, the 
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wrinkles on the forehead, his nose, 
everything. 
(T. 57-58). When Ms. Horn was then shown a photograph of the 
line-up she attended, she identified a different person in the 
line-up as Appellant (T. 66-67). Ms. Horn was the only witness 
who made an eyewitness identification of Appellant as the 
perpetrator of the robbery. 
This in court identification was a product of the fact 
that Appellant was the person sitting in the defendant's chair at 
trial, and was not the product of Ms. Horn's independent 
recollection of the identification of the robber from the 
robbery. "Under the totality of the circumstances, [the 
identification] was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to 
irreparable mistaken identification" that it denied Appellant a 
fair trial. The factors to be used in evaluating this due 
process1 claim are provided in State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 
(Utah 1980): 
In determining the reliability of the 
identification under the totality of the 
circumstances, the court must also consider 
the opportunity of the witness to view the 
criminal at the time of the crime, the 
witness's degree of attention, the accuracy 
of any prior description of the criminal, the 
level of certainty demonstrated during the 
identification procedure, and the time 
between the crime and the identification. 
1 The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides "nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 
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Id. at 357, citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972)/ 
A. Opportunity to View Assailant 
Micki Horn testified that on August 21, 1988, the 
Assailant, who was wearing two nylons on his head and pointing a 
sawed-off shotgun at her, approached her from behind, grabbed her 
arm and dragged her to a counter, demanding money (T. 52). Ms. 
Horn testified that her nervousness made it difficult for her to 
operate the cash register (T. 52-53). The robber reportedly 
threatened to "cut her in half" if she set off the alarm when she 
was getting the money out of the register (T. 53), and it was at 
this time that Ms. Horn claimed to have gotten a good look at him 
(T. 55). As soon as the robber received the money, more 
customers came into the store, and the robber ordered Ms. Horn to 
get rid of them, at which time he left the store (T. 55, 58). 
Ms. Horn and Appellant were apparently of different racial 
backgrounds (R. 98). 
In short, Ms. Horn had limited opportunity to view the 
assailant. £f. State v. Thamer, No. 870078, filed June 22, 1989 
(Utah), slip opinion at 5 and 6 (victim saw unmasked assailant 
and recognized him as someone who had dated her next door 
neighbor); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 357 (Utah 
2 In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), the court 
criticized the factors listed in Neil v. Biggers as "based on 
assumptions that are flatly contradicted by well-respected and 
essentially unchallenged empirical studies." Long at 491. 
Following this criticism, the factors listed in Neil v. Biggers 
were relied on by the Utah Supreme Court in its recent case of 
State v. Thamer, No. 870078 (filed June 22, 1989). Appellant 
will apply the Neil v. Biggers test, and will point out when the 
Long criticisms of that test are pertinent. 
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1980)(victim viewed assailant for a short period of time in the 
dark after victim had just awakened); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483, 487, 489 (Utah 1986)(indicating that the victim viewed 
assailant's face for six seconds and viewed his back for thirty 
seconds in the dark, and noting "the well documented fact that 
identifications tend to be more accurate where the person 
observing and the one being observed are of the same race"); 
Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977)(witness spoke with 
defendant for two or three minutes, viewing him in the light). 
B. Degree of Attention 
In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), the court 
noted, "Another limitation which can affect perception is the 
emotional state of the observer. Contrary to much accepted lore, 
when an observer is experiencing a marked degree of stress, 
perceptual abilities are known to decrease significantly." Id. 
at 489 (citation omitted). 
Ms. Horn's testimony indicates no time lag between the 
events of the robbery - certainly in being accosted by a masked 
man pointing a sawed-off shotgun at her and dragging her to get 
money, Ms. Horn must have been under considerable stress. The 
entrance of the customers and the activities of her co-worker, 
Julie Lund, could only have distracted Ms. Horn further from 
perceiving the robber's appearance. She indicated that she got 
her good look at the robber when he threatened to "cut her in 
half", while she was fumbling with the cash register. In these 
circumstances, Ms. Horn's degree of attention was insufficient 
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to provide an independent basis for the in court identification. 
Cf. State v. Thamer, slip opinion at 6 (victim was with the 
assailant from sixty to ninety minutes, saw his unmasked face, 
and recognized him and his manner of speech from prior 
occurrences); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986)(victim 
viewed assailant as victim was shot and blown against a wall, and 
as victim returned fire); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 115 
(1977)(witness was police officer, trained to make detailed 
observations, and aware that his observations would be subject to 
scrutiny later in the prosecution). 
C. Accuracy of Description 
Ms. Horn's description on the day of the robbery of 
the robber was vague - she told the police that the assailant had 
dark skin and dark hair, was possibly Hispanic, and she described 
his build and clothing to them (T. 64). Her failure to identify 
Appellant, who is black, at the subsequent line-up, and to 
identify him in the photograph of the lineup underscores the 
vagary of her perception of Appellant. Cf. State v. Long, 721 
P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986)("Further, Rocha failed to identify 
defendant from a six-photo array presented to him three days 
after the shooting...Rocha identified Long at trial and at two 
preliminary hearings; however, the record indicates that these 
identifications took place not in formal lineups, but in 
courtroom proceedings during which Long was apparently the only 
black man present."); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 115 
(1977)(witness provided description of race, height, build, color 
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and style of hair, facial bone structure, and clothing). 
D. Level of Certainty 
Inasmuch as Ms. Horn indicated that her in court 
identification of Appellant as the perpetrator hit her "like a 
ton of bricks" (T. 57-58), it is safe to say that her level of 
certainty in making the identification was high. However, her 
identification of the wrong person as Appellant in the line-up 
photograph seemed equally certain until she learned that she had 
identified the wrong person as Appellant (T. 66, 71). Cif. State 
v. Thamer, No. 870078, filed June 22, 1989 (Utah), slip opinion 
at 6 (witness1 equivocation in identifying the perpetrator was 
minimal, she consistently identified him throughout the 
proceedings). 
It should also be noted that in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483 (Utah 1986), the court indicated that "[r]esearch has also 
undermined the common notion that the confidence with which an 
individual makes an identification is a valid indicator of the 
accuracy of the recollection. In fact, the accuracy of an 
identification is, at times, inversely related to the confidence 
with which it is made." IxU at 490 (citations omitted). 
E. Passage of Time and Confrontation 
In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), the court 
explained the dangers to accurate identification posed by the 
passage of time between the crime and the identification. The 
court stated: 
The memory process is also subject to 
distortion in the second or retention stage, 
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when information that may or may not have 
been accurately perceived is stored in the 
memory. Research demonstrates that both the 
length of time between the witness's 
experience and the recollection of tliat 
experience, and the occurrence of other 
events in the intervening time period, affect 
the accuracy and completeness of recall. 
Just as in the perception stage, where the 
mind infers what occurred from what was 
selected for perception, in the retention 
stage people tend to add extraneous details 
and to fill in memory gaps over time, thereby 
unconsciously constructing more detailed, 
logical, and coherent recollections of their 
actual experiences. Thus, as eyewitnesses 
wend their way through the criminal justice 
process, their reports of what was seen and 
heard tend to become "more accurate, more 
complete and less ambiguous" in appearance. 
The implications of this mental strategy for 
any criminal defendant whose conviction 
hinges on an eyewitness identification are 
obvious. 
Id. at 489-490 (citation omitted). 
The robbery occurred on August 21, 1988. The first 
line-up Ms. Horn attended, at which she did not identify 
Appellant as her assailant, was held on September 29th, 1988 (T. 
55-56). Her in court identification occurred on January 11, 1989 
(T. 57-58). 
This passage of time and Ms. Horn's failure to 
identify Appellant as the perpetrator and as himself in the line-
up photograph demonstrate that the in court identification was 
not the product of her memory of the robbery, which occurred 
almost five months prior. Cjf. State v. Thamer, No. 870078, filed 
June 22, 1989 (Utah), slip opinion at 6 (victim identified 
perpetrator seven weeks after the attack, and her identification 
of him was consistent); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 115-
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116 (1977)(witness described perpetrator within minutes of the 
crime, and identified him two days later). 
F. THE ADMISSION OF THE IDENTIFICATION WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
In Long, the court set forth lengthy requirements and 
rationales behind providing jurors with adequate information in 
jury instructions to ferret out unreliable eyewitness 
identifications. While such an instruction was given in this 
case (See R. 97-100), Appellant asserts that the law of Utah has 
already recognized that such instructions, and even very 
effective cross-examinations of eyewitnesses do not overcome 
jurors1 tendency to believe eyewitnesses. See Long 721 P.2d 483, 
490-492, and n.5 (recognizing juror tendency to believe 
eyewitness identification, without regard to cross-examination of 
eyewitnesses and cautionary instructions.). 
The eyewitness identification was crucial to the 
instant case. The only other evidence tying Appellant to the 
crime was his confession, which the jurors might have discounted 
as his effort to protect his girlfriend, or as never having been 
made, and the unreliable confessions of Rosemary Mar and Genora 
Marcellus, which were not properly admitted into evidence (see 
Point II of this brief). 
Defense counsel informed the court during the 
suppression hearing prior to trial that Appellant was not 
identified in pretrial line-ups (S.H. 3), and the court knew of 
Ms. Horn's equivocations about the perpetrator's identity prior 
to admitting her in court identification (T. 57). Nonetheless, 
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the court assumed that the in court identification was the 
product of Ms. Horn's independent recollection of the robbery, 
and admitted it into evidence. Rather than relying on a curative 
instruction, the court should have recognized that the in court 
identification was not reliable and highly prejudicial. The 
court's callous disregard of Appellant's right to due process 
should be reversed by this Court. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED 
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION 
AND UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 802 
BY ADMITTING THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF 
ROSEMARY MAR AND GENORA MARCELLUS. 
As noted in the statement of facts, Officer Edwards 
testified that he took statements from Rosemary Mar and Genora 
Marcellus to the effect that Appellant robbed the Payless Store 
(T. 148-154). On January 11, 1989, Appellant moved to suppress 
the statements of Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus. The 
transcript of the hearing on this motion will hereinafter be 
referred to by the initials "S.H." The court admitted the 
statements of Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus over objection as 
"statements against interest" after finding the witnesses 
unavailable under Utah Rule of Evidence 804 (T. 48, S.H. 43-44). 
When Detective Edwards began testifying about the interview with 
Ms. Mar, the court interrupted, explaining to the jurors as 
follows: 
Obviously the testimony that he is 
referring to as to that which she said is 
hearsay. Prior to this hearing the court has 
ruled, however, the unavailability of those 
witnesses — there was appropriate effort, 
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the court has found, by the law enforcement 
agencies to locate those witnesses which 
make it possible that the officer may testify 
and you may [ac]cept that as though that 
witness were testifying. 
(T. 150). 
The court, in effect telling the jurors to accept as 
fact Detective Edward's claims that the confessions were made, 
3 
constituted a misstatement of the law and improper comment on 
the evidence. This bolstering of the hearsay statements by the 
court exacerbated the violation of Appellant's rights to 
confrontation, discussed infra. 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides the accused with the right "to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him." Article I section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution provides the same protection. State v. Brooks, 638 
P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1981)(Article I section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution is construed the same as the federal counterpart). 
In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), the 
3 There is no rule of law that translates the 
unavailability of a hearsay declarant into automatic credibility 
of the witness relaying the hearsay declarant's statements. 
4 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 51 provides "The court 
shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court 
states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors that 
they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact." See 
State v. Sanders, 496 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah 1972)("[T]his does not 
prevent the trial court from including in his instructions 
general statements concerning certain types of evidence, nor 
concerning the burdens of proof and the sometimes varying degrees 
of proof required. But it does enjoin him from commenting on the 
quality or credibility of the evidence in such a way as to 
indicate that he favors the claims or the position of either 
party."). 
17 
prosecutor read the contents of a separately-tried co-
5 
defendant's confession into evidence during Douglas1 trial, and 
police officers testified that he (Loyd) had made the confession, 
but Loyd claimed his privilege not to incriminate himself, and 
refused to testify• _Id. at 416-417. The Court held that the 
admission of Loyd's confession violated Douglas' right to 
confront the witnesses against him, explaining: 
Loyd's alleged statement that the petitioner 
fired the shotgun constituted the only direct 
evidence that he had done so; coupled with 
the description of the circumstances 
surrounding the shooting, this formed a 
crucial link in the proof both of 
petitioner's act and of the requisite intent 
to murder.... Nor was the opportunity to 
cross-examine the law enforcement officers 
adequate to redress this denial of the 
essential right secured by the Confrontation 
Clause. Indeed, their testimony enhanced the 
danger that the jury would treat the 
Solicitor's questioning of Loyd and Loyd's 
refusal to answer as proving the truth of 
Loyd's alleged confession. But since their 
evidence tended to show only that Loyd made 
the confession, cross-examination of them as 
to its genuineness could not substitute for 
cross-examination of Loyd to test the truth 
of the statement itself. 
Id. at 419. 
In the instant case, Officer Edwards was able to relay 
his version of the testimony of Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus 
"as if they were testifying" (T. 150), but Appellant was never 
5 Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus were apparently never 
prosecuted, although they were arrested for the robbery, and 
their statements were taken on the night of the robbery and their 
arrests. Appellant relies on cases involving hearsay statements 
of unindicted accomplices and co-defendants, because the analysis 
present in those cases is not contingent on whether or not the 
declarant was actually charged with the crime. 
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given the opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Mar or Ms. Marcellus. 
Appellant's opportunity to cross-examine Officer Edwards was no 
substitute for Appellant's rights to confrontation of Ms. Mar 
and Ms. Marcellus, and in admitting their testimony through 
hearsay, the trial court violated Appellant's rights to 
confrontation under the Utah and federal constitutions. 
In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the Court 
interpreted the Confrontation Clause as demanding a two part 
showing prior to the admission of hearsay statements of a non-
testifying witness: 
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not 
present for cross-examination at trial, the 
Confrontation Clause normally requires a 
showing that he is unavailable. Even then, 
his statement is admissible only if it bears 
adequate "indicia of reliability." 
Reliability can be inferred without more in a 
case where the evidence falls within a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other 
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at 
least absent a showing of particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness. 
6 The trial court's admission of the statements of Ms. 
Mars and Ms. Marcellus as "statements against interest" does not 
satisfy the confrontation clause. Inasmuch as both Ms. Mar and 
Ms. Marcellus disclaimed any personal responsibility for the 
robbery, the court's characterization of their statements as 
being "against their penal interest" under Utah Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(3) is questionable. Regardless of the admissibility of 
the statements under well-recognized exceptions to the hearsay 
rule, because they are statements of accomplices, they are 
presumed unreliable. See Lee v* Illinois, at 538-541, 544 n.5 
(explaining the presumed unreliability of accomplice statements, 
and stating "We reject respondent's categorization of the hearsay 
involved in this case as a simple 'declaration against penal 
interest.' That concept defines too large a class for meaningful 
Confrontation Clause analysis. We decide this case as involving 
a confession by an accomplice which incriminates a criminal 
defendant."). 
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Id. at 66. As will be demonstrated, infra, the prosecution in 
this case never carried the burden in admitting the hearsay 
statements of Ms. Mar and Ms. Genora, and the admission of this 
testimony violated Appellant's rights to confrontation. 
A. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT SHOWING OF WITNESS UNAVAILABILITY. 
In Roberts, the Court explained that in seeking to 
admit hearsay statements of non-testifying witnesses, it is the 
prosecution's burden of proof to show a good-faith effort in 
obtaining the witnesses for testimony in court. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56, 74-75. 
Officer Edwards testified that he had been unable to 
find Ms. Mar at her home address, and that he had recently 
discovered that she had been going by an assumed name (S.H. 40). 
He testified that he had talked with an investigator from the 
county attorney's office, but was unable to find Ms. Mar (S.H. 
40). 
Officer Edwards testified that he called Ms. Marcellus' 
home, and that Ms. Marcellus' mother indicated that Ms. Marcellus 
had received the subpoena and would obey it (S.H. 39-40). While 
Ms. Marcellus disobeyed the subpoenas for the preliminary hearing 
and the trial, the prosecution never presented any proof that any 
officers of the State made any efforts to obtain her presence 
other than mailing the subpoenas and making the one phone call to 
her mother. 
Officer Edwards contacted Appellant's sister, Audrey, 
who owned the car which Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus were driving 
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the day of the robbery, but he never inquired as to the 
whereabouts of Ms. Mar, who Audrey testified was in Indianapolis 
(T.2 47, 51-52). 
The prosecutor indicated that he had mailed subpoenas 
to Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus twice, and that the Mar subpoenas 
were sent to the same address twice, and returned both times 
because of improper address (S.H. 41-42). While he stated that 
he didn't expect either witness to obey the subpoenas and that 
they had disobeyed them in the past (T. 34-35), the prosecution 
made no indication that contempt proceedings allowed by Utah Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 14 were carried through, or that any other 
attempt to enforce the subpoenas was made. 
The fact that the prosecution in this case failed to 
make a good faith effort to locate these witnesses is 
demonstrated by comparing this case with Roberts. There, the 
Court found that the prosecution had met the burden of proving a 
good faith effort to obtain the witnesses at trial because, 
despite the prosecution's subpoenaing the witness five times, and 
voir diring her parents as to her whereabouts, the non-testifying 
witness could not be found by her own family, who had tried to 
7 
reach her, by her friend, or by the prosecution. Id_. at 75. 
7 Also compare the facts of this case with State v. Case, 
752 P.2d 356, 357-358 (Utah App. 1987)(trial court violated 
defendant's right to confrontation by admitting tape recording of 
victim's preliminary hearing testimony at trial; while 
prosecution maintained close contact with the witness, the 
prosecution failed to use the Uniform Act to Secure the 
Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal 
Proceedings, when on notice that the witness might not attend the 
trial), dicta concerning reliability of former testimony 
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The prosecution in this case apparently gave up the 
effort to obtain Ms. Mar's presence at trial after mailing two 
subpoenas to the wrong address, and apparently gave up the effort 
to obtain Ms. Marcellus1 presence at trial after mailing 
subpoenas to the right address, and after Ms. Marcellus failed to 
comport with her mother's indication that she would obey the 
subpoenas. There was no evidence presented of any attempts to 
enforce the subpoenas. 
The State may have made a showing that obtaining the 
witnesses for in-court testimony was inconvenient. However, it 
failed to show a good faith effort to obtain the witnesses. 
Thus, the admission of the hearsay statements violated 
Appellant's rights to confrontation under the Utah and federal 
constitutions. 
B. THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS WERE UNRELIABLE. 
Detective Ron Edwards of the West Valley Police 
department was called on August 21, 1988, to interview Rosemary 
Mar and Genora Marcellus (T. 148), after he had received details 
overruled 758 P.2d 909, 914 (Utah 1988); State v* Chapman, 655 
P.2d 1119, 1122-1123 (state may not ignore statutory remedies 
when the state has notice that witness intends not to appear at 
trial); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 210-216 (non-testifying 
witness residing in Sweden was unavailable because prosecution 
had no power to compel his attendance, and prior cross-
examination of witness provided indicia of reliability satisfying 
the Confrontation Clause), and with Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 
723-726 (1968)(prosecution failed to prove unavailability of 
incarcerated witness, who was subject to subpoena power). 
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8 
of the robbery from the victims (S.H. 15). He stated that after 
he read Ms. Mar her Miranda rights, she agreed to speak with him 
but would not allow the interview to be tape recorded (T. 149). 
According to Detective Edwards, Rosemary said that she and Genora 
and Appellant were in the car together at about 3:00 p.m., and 
that she and Rosemary went into Payless shoes, but were unable to 
find anything they wanted (T. 151). Detective Edwards said that 
after the women returned to the car, Appellant went into the shoe 
store, returning a few minutes later to inform them that he had 
just robbed the store (T. 151). The detective said that Rosemary 
said that when the police began following their car, she threw 
the money and gun out the window, and forced Appellant out of the 
car (T. 152). 
Officer Edwards testified that he then interviewed 
Genora Marcellus, again without tape recording the interview at 
the witness' request (T. 153). The detective said that Genora's 
version of the events was similar to Ms. Mar's (T. 154), but that 
Ms. Marcellus said that she pulled into a Seven-Eleven across the 
street from the Payless shoe store, and that Appellant then went 
and robbed the store (T. 154). Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus both 
denied any foreknowledge that the robbery would occur (S.H. 14, 
34). 
8 While S.H. 15 is somewhat ambiguous as to the sequence 
of Officer Edward's contact with the victims and Ms. Mar and Ms. 
Marcellus, it is clear that Officer Edwards was briefed on the 
facts of the case by Officer Newbold, one of the arresting 
officers who had spoken to the victims and participated in the 
investigation, prior to interviewing Ms. Mars and Ms. Marcellus 
(T. 148). 
23 
Officer Edwards interviewed Appellant at 8:00 p.m. on 
August 22, 1988 (S.H. 10, 11). The officer testified that the 
interview was not recorded and Appellant confessed to the robbery 
after two other officers were excused from the examination room, 
leaving Officer Edwards and Appellant alone (S.H. 12-13). 
Appellant testified at the suppression hearing that he did not 
confess to the crime (S.H. 21). 
The testimony of accomplices is presumed unreliable. 
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), where the Court 
found that Bruton1s right to confrontation was violated by the 
admission of a hearsay confession of a non-testifying co-
defendant, the court explained the lack of reliability of 
statements of accomplices: 
Not only are the incriminations devastating 
to the defendant but their credibility is 
inevitcibly suspect, a fact recognized when 
accomplices do take the stand and the jury is 
instructed to weigh their testimony carefully 
given the recognized motivation to shift 
blame to others. The unreliability of such 
evidence is intolerably compounded when the 
alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify 
and cannot be tested by cross-examination. 
It was against such threats to a fair trial 
that the Confrontation Clause was directed. 
Id. 135-136. 
In Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), Lee was 
convicted, in a joint trial with a co-defendant, Thomas, of 
killing her Aunt Beedie. In the bench trial, the court relied on 
parts of Thomas' confession in convicting Lee. IcU at 531. 
Thomas' confession was obtained after Lee had already confessed 
and after she asked Thomas to accept part of the responsibility 
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for the murder of Lee's Aunt Beedie and Odessa Harris. JEd. at 
533. 
Lee's statement indicated that there was some 
longstanding discomfort between Lee and Thomas and the victims, 
that Thomas stabbed Odessa after slight verbal provocation, that 
Aunt Beedie had threatened and tried to kill Lee# and that Lee 
then stabbed Aunt Beedie. Id^. at 533-534. 
Thomas' statement was similar to Lee's but indicated a 
premeditated plan of Lee's and Thomas' to kill the two victims, 
and indicated that it was Lee, and not Thomas, who decided to 
kill the victims that night. IcJ. at 535. 
The prosecutor apparently confused which statements 
were made by which defendants in argument to the court, and 
relied on Thomas' confession to convict Lee. Id_. at 537. The 
court explicitly relied on information gleaned from Thomas' 
confession in convicting Lee, and the Supreme Court found that 
this violated the Confrontation Clause of the federal 
constitution: 
We need not address the question of Thomas' 
availability, for we hold that Thomas' 
statement, as the confession of an 
accomplice, was presumptively unreliable and 
that it did not bear sufficient independent 
"indicia of reliability" to overcome that 
presumption. 
Id. at 538-539. The Court elaborated on the lack of reliability 
of accomplice testimony: 
Our cases recognize that the 
truthfinding function of the Confrontation 
Clause is uniquely threatened when an 
accomplice's confession is sought to be 
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introduced against a criminal defendant 
without the benefit of cross-examination. As 
has been noted, such a confession "is 
hearsay, subject to all the dangers of 
inaccuracy which characterize hearsay 
generally. . . . More than this, however, the 
arrest statements of a codefendant have 
traditionally been viewed with special 
suspicion. Due to his strong motivation to 
implicate the defendant and to exonerate 
•himself, a codefendant's statements about 
what the defendant said or did are less 
credible than ordinary hearsay evidence." 
Id. at 541 (citations omitted). 
The Court also rejected the argument that because the 
confessions "interlocked", they were reliable. The Court 
stated: 
Obviously, when codefendants1 confessions are 
identical in all material respects, the 
likelihood that they are accurate is 
significantly increased. But a confession is 
not necessarily rendered reliable simply 
because some of the facts it contains 
"interlock" with the facts in the defendant's 
statement. The true danger inherent in this 
type of hearsay is, in fact, its selective 
reliability. As we have consistently 
recognized, a codefendant's confession is 
presumptively unreliable as to the passages 
detailing the defendant's conduct or 
culpability because those passages may well 
be the product of the codefendant's desire to 
shift or spread the blame, curry favor, 
avenge himself, or divert attention to 
another. If those portions of the 
codefendant's purportedly "interlocking" 
statement which bear to any significant 
degree on the defendant's participation in 
the crime are not thoroughly substantiated by 
the defendant's own confession, the admission 
of the statement poses too serious a threat 
to the accuracy of the verdict to be 
countenanced by the Sixth Amendment. In 
other words, when the discrepancies between 
the statements are not insignificant, the 
codefendant's confession may not be admitted. 
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Id. at 545. 
In the instant case, the State may argue that the 
presumption of unreliability applicable to the confessions of Ms. 
Mar, Ms. Marcellus, and Appellant is rebutted by the fact that 
the accomplice confessions "interlock". There are three areas of 
incongruity among the three confessions: Ms. Mar's and Ms. 
Marcullus' foreknowledge of the robbery, Ms. Mar's and Ms. 
Marcellus' participation in casing the store prior to the 
robbery, and the identity of the person who wanted the robbery 
committed. 
Before concluding that these incongruities are 
insignificant and that the "interlock" of the three confessions 
therefore justifies their admission under the Confrontation 
Clause, however, this Court must recognize that the statements 
were all allegedly taken by one officer, who did not record the 
statements, and who knew the details of the crime prior to 
conducting the interviews. Appellant testified at the 
suppression hearing that his confession never occurred, and Ms. 
Mar and Ms. Marcellus never testified. This factor dissipates 
9 
further the reliability of the confessions. 
9 See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (1965)("Nor was 
the opportunity to cross-examine the law enforcement officers 
adequate to redress this denial of the essential right secured by 
the Confrontation Clause. Indeed, their testimony enhanced the 
danger that the jury would treat the Solicitor's questioning of 
Loyd and Loyd's refusal to answer as proving the truth of Loyd's 
alleged confession. But since their evidence tended to show only 
that Loyd made the confession, cross-examination of them as to 
its genuineness could not substitute for cross-examination of 
Loyd to test the truth of the statement itself."). 
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In the Lee Court's rejection of the state's efforts to 
rebut the presumption of the unreliability of Thomas1 
confession, the Court cited various factors which parallel those 
in the instant case. The Court discussed the circumstances under 
which Thomas' confession was obtained: 
When Thomas was taken in for questioning and 
read his rights he refused to talk to the 
police. The confession was elicited only 
after Thomas was told that Lee had already 
implicated him and only after he was implored 
by Lee to share "the rap" with her. The 
unsworn statement was given in response to 
the questions of police, who, having already 
interrogated Lee, no doubt knew what they 
were looking for, and the statement was not 
tested in any manner by contemporaneous 
cross-examination by counsel, or its 
equivalent. Although, as the State points 
out, the confession was found to be voluntary 
for Fifth Amendment purposes, such a finding 
does not bear on the question of whether the 
confession was also free from any desire, 
motive, or impulse Thomas may have had either 
to mitigate the appearance of his own 
culpability by spreading the blame or to 
overstcite Lee' s involvement in retaliation 
for her having implicated him in the murders. 
Id. at 544. 
In the instant case, Ms. Mar, Ms. Marcellus, and 
Appellant were all supposedly interviewed after Officer Edwards 
had interviewed the victims of the robbery. Thus, Officer 
Edwards knew what he was looking for. Appellant's confession 
10 While Lee's discussion of the reliability of the 
confession focuses solely on the reliability of the confession of 
the co-defendant, Thomas, Appellant asserts that the reliability 
of his own confession must also be proved before any finding of 
reliability of the confessions is inferred from the 
"interlocking" between the confessions of Appellant and his 
accomplices. 
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supposedly followed Officer Edward's informing Appellant that 
Rosemary had already confessed. Not only was there no protection 
of cross-examination to test the credibility of the confessions, 
but also there was no recording of any interview with which to 
test the accuracy of the content of the confessions.il Ms. Mar, 
Ms. Marcellus, and Appellant all attributed responsibility for 
the robbery to someone other than themselves. In this case, as 
in Lee, the "interlock" between the three confessions failed to 
overcome the presumption that confessions of accomplices are too 
unreliable to admit through hearsay, and the trial court's 
admission of the confessions violated Appellant's right to 
confrontation. 
C. THE ADMISSION OF THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS VIOLATED UTAH RULE OF 
EVIDENCE 802. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as "a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying 
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted." Utah Rule of Evidence 802 prohibits the 
admission of hearsay. 
The statements of Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus were made 
out of court, and were submitted as substantive evidence of 
Appellant's guilt ("offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted"). In admitting this hearsay, the trial court purported 
11 See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 192 
(1987)(reliability of petitioner's confession was dissipated by 
its transmission through the person who witnessed it and 
testified about it in court, as compared to the better 
reliability of the videotaped confession of accomplice). 
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to act under Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), which provides as 
follows: 
A statement which was at the time of its 
making so far contrary to the declarant's 
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far 
tended to subject him to civil or criminal 
liability, or to render invalid a claim by 
him against another, that a reasonable man in 
his position would not have made the 
statement unless he believed it to be true. 
A statement tending to expose the declarant 
to criminal liability and offered to 
exculpate the accused is not admissible 
unless corroborating circumstances clearly 
indicate the trustworthiness of the 
statement. 
Neither Ms. Marcellus nor Ms. Mar claimed 
responsibility for the robbery in their statements to Detective 
Edwards. In fact, they both claimed that they were unaware that 
the robbery would occur until after it already did (T. 151, 154, 
S.H. 14, 34). The statements of accomplices are traditionally 
considered to be exculpatory of the declarants, Lee v. Illinois, 
476 U.S. 530, 545 (1986), and in this case, there was no 
foundational showing that either of the witnesses believed that 
their statements would subject them to criminal liability. 
Thus, the trial court's reliance on the "statement 
against penal interest" exception was misplaced, and in admitting 
the statements of Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus, the trial court 
violated Utah Rule of Evidence 802. 
D. THE ADMISSION OF THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF MS. MAR AND MS. 
MARCELLUS WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
In order to overcome the trial court's violation of 
Appellant's federal right to confrontation, the State must 
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demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987). 
Particularly when the statements of Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus are 
viewed in light of the trial court's improper comment that the 
jurors should accept Officer Edwards' account of the statements 
as accurate, the State cannot meet this burden of proof. 
In Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979), a plurality 
opinion, the Court addressed the admissibility under the 
Confrontation Clause of confessions of co-defendants which 
interlock with a confession of the defendant on trial, as long as 
jurors are instructed to consider each confession solely as it 
relates to the declarant. Three members of the Court reasoned 
that the admission of the confessions of the co-defendants were 
not excluded under Bruton or the Confrontation Clause because the 
defendant's own confession interlocks with those of his co-
defendants, proving his guilt, and corroborating the reliability 
of the co-defendant's statements, rendering the benefits to be 
gained through cross-examination and confrontation unnecessary. 
Id. at 72-73. 
The plurality opinion in Parker v. Randolph was 
rejected by a majority of the Court in Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 
186 (1987). There, the petitioner was convicted of murder, in 
part with a videotaped confession of a co-defendant which 
interlocked with a confession allegedly made by the petitioner to 
a third person who quoted it at the petitioner's trial. The 
court explained the prejudice leveled by the admission of 
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interlocking confessions: 
In fact, it seems to us that 
"interlocking" bears a positively inverse 
relationship to devastation. A codefendant*s 
confession will be relatively harmless if the 
incriminating story it tells is different 
from that which the defendant himself is 
alleged to have told, but enormously damaging 
if it confirms, in all essential respects, 
the defendant's alleged confession. It might 
be otherwise if the defendant were standing 
by his confession, in which case it could be 
said that the codefendant's confession does 
no more than support the defendant's very own 
case. But in the real world of criminal 
litigation, the defendant is seeking to avoid 
his confession - on the ground that it was 
not accurately reported, or that it was not 
really true when made. In the present case, 
for example, the petitioner sought to 
establish that [the witness relaying the 
petitioner's alleged confession] had a motive 
for falsely reporting a confession that never 
in fact occurred. In such circumstances a 
codefendant's confession that corroborates 
the defendant's confession significantly 
harms the defendant's case, whereas one that 
is positively incompatible gives credence to 
the defendant's assertion that the alleged 
confession was nonexistent or false. 
Id. at 192. 
In this case, the confessions of Ms. Mar, Ms. 
Marcellus, and Appellant were the only evidence of Appellant's 
participation in the robbery (aside from the in court 
identification by the victim, Micki Horn, which should have been 
suppressed). The confessions in this case interlocked to a great 
degree, and must have added credence to the confession that 
Officer Edwards testified Appellant made to him. In the absence 
of the admission of the statements Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus 
allegedly made to Officer Edwards, the jurors might have 
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discounted Appellant's alleged confession as fiction authored by 
Officer Edwards, or as Appellant's effort to protect his 
girlfriend# Rosemary Mar. The admission of the hearsay 
statements constituted prejudicial error. 
III. 
APPELLANT'S SENTENCE WAS IMPROPERLY 
ENHANCED TWICE FOR THE USE OF A FIREARM. 
Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery and was 
also given an additional five year sentence, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 76-3-203/ for use of a firearm during the 
commission of a felony (R. 114-115). 
The robbery for which Appellant was convicted was 
classified as an "aggravated robbery"/ a first degree felony, 
12 
because the robber used a firearm in the course of the robbery. 
While the Utah State Legislature has provided for extra 
punishment for the use of firearms and other dangerous weapons in 
12 At the time Appellant was tried, Utah Code Ann. section 
76-6-302 provided 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery 
if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a 
deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of 
the first degree. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an 
act shall be deemed to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit, during the commission of, 
or in the immediate flight after the attempt 
or commission of a robbery. 
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all felonies, the trial court erred in applying this general 
enhancement during Appellant's sentencing because the use of the 
firearm was already factored into Appellant's sentence by the 
elevation of the robbery for which Appellant was convicted to an 
aggravated first degree felony robbery. This double enhancement 
of Appellant's sentence is not supported by the applicable 
statutes, and violated Appellant's rights under the Double 
Jeopardy Clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
A. Legislative Intent. 
In Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978), the 
appellants had been convicted of bank robberies committed with 
firearms, and were sentenced to serve enhanced terms under both 
13 Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203 provides 
A person who has been convicted of a 
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of 
the first degree, for a term at not 
less than five years, unless 
otherwise specifically provided by 
law, and which may be for life but 
if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was 
used in the commission or 
furtherance of the felony, the 
court shall additionally sentence 
the person convicted for a term of 
one year to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and the court may 
additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not 
concurrently... 
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the statute defining the elements of the robbery/4 and under a 
federal firearm enhancement statute.15 The Court determined that 
14 18 U.S.C. sections 2113(a) and (d) provided: 
(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or 
by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, 
from the person or presence of another any 
property or money or any other thing of value 
belonging to, or in the care, custody, 
control, management, or possession of, any 
bank, credit union, or any savings and loan 
association; or 
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any 
bank, credit union, or any savings and loan 
association, or any building used in whole or 
in part as a bank, credit union, or in such 
savings and loan association, or building, or 
part thereof, so used, any felony affecting 
such bank, credit union, or such savings and 
loan association and in violation of any 
statute of the United States, or any larceny 
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or 
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or 
both. 
« . . . 
(d) Whoever, in committing, or in 
attempting to commit, any offense defined in 
subsections (a) and (b) of this section, 
assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the 
life of any person by the use of a dangerous 
weapon or device, shall be fined not more 
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 
twenty-five years, or both. 
Simpson, 435 U.S. 6, 7 n.l. 
15 18 U.S.C. section 924(c) provided: 
(c) Whoever — 
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony 
for which he may be prosecuted in a court of 
the United States, or 
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during 
the commission of any felony for which he may 
be prosecuted in a court of the United 
sTates, "shall, in addition to the punishment 
provided for the commission of such felony, 
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 
not less than one year not more than ten 
years. In the case of his second or 
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enhancing the appellants' sentences under both statutes was 
improper because the legislature did not intend the double 
enhancement. The Court's rationale was tripartite. 
First, the Court noted that the overall legislative 
history of the statute, and the sponsor of the enhancement 
statute during the introduction of the legislation indicated that 
the enhancement was not intended to apply to crimes which account 
1 f\ for the use of a firearm. I<3. at 13, 14. 
Second, the Court noted that interpreting the statutes 
as allowing double enhancement would "violate the established 
rule of construction that * ambiguity concerning the ambit of 
subsequent conviction under this subsection, 
such person shall be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment for not less than two nor more 
than twenty-five years and, notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, the court shall 
not suspend the sentence in the case of a 
second or subsequent conviction of such 
person or give him a probationary sentence, 
nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed 
under this subsection run concurrently with 
any term of imprisonment imposed for the 
commission of such felony. 
Simpson at 8, n.2. 
16 The Utah legislative debates concerning the firearm 
enhancement statute reflect legislative intent to stave off the 
enactment of gun control laws effecting sportsmen by enacting 
laws against illegal use of firearms, and to deter criminals from 
using firearms. There is no discussion indicating that the 
legislature intended for the firearm enhancement to be applied in 
circumstances such as aggravated robbery, in which use of a 
firearm is an element of the crime charged. Legislative Budget 
Session 1/13/76, discussion of House Bill 3, second day, disc 2 
side 1, selections 9-13; General Session 2/28/77, discussion of 
Substitute House Bill 323, disc 1 (numbered 181), side 1, 
selections 21-30, side 2, selections 13-30, disc 2 (numbered 
182), side 1, selections 0-3. 
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criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.'" 
Simpson at 14, 15, quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 
347 (1971).17 
Third, the Court found the firearm enhancement in the 
statute defining the robbery should apply, by virtue of the 
principle that "where a general statute and a specific statute 
speak to the same concern, even if the general provision was 
enacted later," the specific statute takes precedence. IcU at 
is." 
Because there is no expression of legislative intent to 
impose double enhancement for use of a firearm in an aggravated 
robbery, and because basic standards of statutory construction 
do not allow double enhancement to be presumed into practice, the 
trial court erred in enhancing Appellant's sentence tv/ice for the 
use of a firearm. 
B* Double Jeopardy 
The Simpson Court noted that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, which prohibits "multiple punishments for the same 
offense", might be offended in cases such as the instant one, 
in which the government is able to prove the violation of two 
separate statutes with one set of facts. Simpson at 11, n.5, 
17 Accord State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 562 (Utah 
1987)(Durham, J. dissenting)("It is well established that 
ambiguities in criminal statutes must be resolved in favor of lenity."). 
18 Accord Cannon v. Gardner, 611 P.2d 1207, 1209 (Utah 1980). 
19 Accord State v. Miller, 747 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah App. 
1987). 
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quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). The Court 
stated the test for the possible violation of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause: 
"[t]he applicable rule is that where the same 
act or transaction constitutes a violation of 
two distinct statutory provisions, the test 
to be applied to determine whether there are 
two offenses or only one, is whether each 
provision requires proof of a fact which the 
other does not." 
Id* at 11, quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 
304 (1932). 
In State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979), the 
Appellant argued that his convictions under Utah Code Ann. 
section 76-10-505, 2 0 and Utah Code Ann. section 76-10-503(1) ,21 
20 Utah Code Ann. section 76-10-505 provided as follows 
Every person who carries a loaded 
firearm in a vehicle or on any public street 
in an incorporated city or in a prohibited 
area of an unincorporated territory within 
this state is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
Sosa at 345. 
21 Utah Code Ann. section 76-10-503(1) provided as 
follows: 
Any person who is not a citizen of the 
United States, or any person who has been 
convicted of any crime of violence under the 
laws of the United States, the state of Utah, 
or any other state, government, or country, . 
. . shall not own or have in his possession 
or under his custody or control any dangerous 
weapon as defined in this part. .Any person 
who violates this section is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous 
weapon is a firearm or sawed-off shotgun he 
shall be guilty of a felony of the third 
degree. 
Sosa at 345. 
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violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Utah and federal 
constitutions. The court rejected this argument, stating 
Because the elements of appellant's separate 
prosecutions differ, and either offense could 
have been established without establishing 
the other, the double jeopardy doctrine does 
not apply in the instant case. 
Id. at 346. 
In this case, Appellant could not have committed the 
aggravated robbery without violating the firearm enhancement 
statute .23 
In State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978), the 
appellant, who apparently hit a person while shooting at cars 
passing his across the freeway, was convicted of aggravated 
22 Utah Constitution Article I section 12 provides that 
"...nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense.". United States Constitution Amendment V provides "nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb". 
23 Compare section 76-6-302 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery 
if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a 
deadly weapon; ... 
with Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203 
if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a 
facsimile or the representation of a firearm 
was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted for a term of 
one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and the court may additionally 
sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years 
to run consecutively and not concurrently... 
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assault, which was defined by Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-103 
(1978): 
(1) a person commits aggravated assault if he 
commits assault as defined in section 76-5-
10224 and: 
(a) He intentionally causes serious 
bodily injury to another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such 
means or force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury. 
His sentence was increased pursuant to the firearm enhancement 
statute, Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203, which provided, 
A person who has been convicted of a 
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as follows: (3) In the 
case of a felony of the third degree, for a 
term not to exceed five years but if the 
trier of fact finds a firearm was used in the 
commission of the felony, the court may 
additionally sentence the person convicted 
for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
Angus at 994. The appellant argued that the application of the 
firearm enhancement created two punishments for one offense. Id. 
at 994. The court rejected this argument, explaining that the 
legislature was acting within its bounds in prescribing in two 
separate statutes additional punishment for crimes committed with 
dangerous weapons in general, and even more severe punishment for 
crimes committed with the more dangerous of dangerous weapons -
24 Section 76-5-102 provided, in part: 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another. 
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firearms* Angus at 995. 
In the instant case, the legislature was not attempting 
to distinguish in two statutes between the punishments for two 
distinguished evils (dangerous weapons and more dangerous 
firearms) in two separate statutes - both statutes involved in 
the instant case call for unique punishment for use of a firearm. 
In allowing Appellant to be punished twice for the same 
offense# the trial court violated Appellant's rights under the 
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Utah and federal constitutions. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Appellant's conviction for 
aggravated robbery and remand this case to the trial court for a 
new trial and for sentencing consistent with Appellant's rights 
under the Double Jeopardy clauses of the Utah and federal 
constitutions. A 
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ADDENDUM 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights 
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put 
in jeopardy for the same offense. 
United States Constitution Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation. 
United States Constitution Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defence. 
United States Constitution Amendment XIV 
•..nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203 
A person who has been convicted of a 
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of 
the first degree, for a term at not 
less than five years, unless 
otherwise specifically provided by 
law, and which may be for life but 
if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was 
used in the commission or 
furtherance of the felony, the 
court shall additionally sentence 
the person convicted for a term of 
one year to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and the court may 
cidditionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently... 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-103 
(1) a person commits aggravated assault if he 
commits assault as defined in section 76-5-
1021 and: 
(a) He intentionally causes serious 
bodily injury to another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such 
means or force likely to produce death or 
Section 76-5-102 provided, in part: 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another. 
serious bodily injury. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-302 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery 
if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a 
deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of 
the first degree. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an 
act shall be deemed to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit, during the commission of, 
or in the immediate flight after the attempt 
or commission of a robbery. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-10-503(1) 
Any person who is not a citizen of the 
United States, or .any person who has been 
convicted of any crime of violence under the 
laws of the United States, the state of Utah, 
or any other state, government, or country, . 
. . shall not own or have in his possession 
or under his custody or control any dangerous 
weapon as defined in this part. Any person 
who violates this section is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous 
weapon is a firearm or sawed-off shotgun he 
shall be guilty of a felony of the third 
degree. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-10-505 
Every person who carries a loaded 
firearm in a vehicle or on any public street 
in an incorporated city or in a prohibited 
area of an unincorporated territory within 
this state is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 
(a) A subpoena to require the attendance 
of a witness or interpreter before a court, 
magistrate or grand jury in connection with a 
criminal investigation or prosecution may be 
issued by the magistrate with whom an 
information is filed, the county attorney on 
his own initiative or upon the direction of 
the grand jury, or the court in which an 
information or indictment is to be tried. 
The clerk of the court in which a case is 
pending shall issue in blank to the 
defendant, without charge, as many signed 
subpoenas as the defendant may require. 
(b) A subpoena may command the person 
to whom it is directed to appear and testify 
or to produce in court or to allow inspection 
of records, papers or other objects. The 
court may quash or modify the subpoena if 
compliance would be unreasonable. 
(c) A subpoena may be served by any 
person over the age of 18 years who is not a 
party. Service shall be made by delivering a 
copy of the subpoena to the witness or 
interpreter personally and notifying him of 
the contents. A peace officer shall serve 
any subpoena delivered to him for service in 
his county. 
(d) Written return of service of a 
subpoena shall be made promptly to the court 
and to the person requesting that the 
subpoena be served, stating the time and 
place of service an by whom service was made. 
(e) A subpoena may compel the attendance 
of a witness from anywhere in the state. 
(f) When a person required as a witness 
is in custody v/ithin the state, the court may 
order the officer having custody of the 
witness to bring him before the court. 
(g) Failure to obey a subpoena without 
reasonable excuse may be deemed a contempt of 
the court responsible for its issuance. 
(h) Whenever a material witness is about 
to leave the state, or is so ill or infirm as 
to afford reasonable grounds for believing 
that he will be unable to attend a trial or 
hearing, either party may, upon notice to the 
other, apply to the court for an order that 
the witness be examined conditionally be 
deposition. Attendance of the witness at the 
deposition may be compelled by subpoena. The 
defendant shall be present at the deposition 
and the court shall make whatever order is 
necessary to effect such attendance. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 51 
.... 
The court shall not comment on the evidence 
in the case, and if the court states any of 
the evidence, it must instruct the jurors 
that they are the exclusive judges of all 
questions of fact. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 801 
[hearsay is defined as] a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered 
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 802 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided 
by law or by these rules. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 804 
(a) "Unavailability of a witness" 
includes situations in which the declarant: 
(1) is exempted by ruling of 
the court on the ground of 
privilege from testifying 
concerning the subject matter of 
his statement; or 
(2) persists in refusing to 
testify concerning the subject 
matter of his statement despite an 
order of the court to do so; or 
(4) is unable to be present or 
to testify at the hearing because 
of death or then existing physical 
or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing 
and the proponent of his statement 
has been unable to procure his 
attendance by process or other 
reasonable means. 
.... 
(b) The following are not excluded by 
the hearsay rule if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness: 
.... 
(3) A statement which was at the time of 
its making so far contrary to the declarant's 
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far 
tended to subject him to civil or criminal 
liability, or to render invalid a claim by 
him against another, that a reasonable man in 
his position would not have made the 
statement unless he believed it to be true. 
A statement tending to expose the declarant 
to criminal liability and offered to 
exculpate the accused is not admissible 
unless corroborating circumstances clearly 
indicate the trustworthiness of the 
statement. 
18 U.S.C. section 924(c) 
(c) Whoever — 
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony 
for which he may be prosecuted in a court of 
the United States, or 
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during 
the commission of any felony for which he may 
be prosecuted in a court of the United 
sTates, "shall, in addition to the punishment 
provided for the commission of such felony, 
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 
not less than one year not more than ten 
years. In the case of his second or 
subsequent conviction under this subsection, 
such person shall be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment for not less than two nor more 
than twenty-five years and, notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, the court shall 
not suspend the sentence in the case of a 
second or subsequent conviction of such 
person or give him a probationary sentence, 
nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed 
under this subsection run concurrently with 
any term of imprisonment imposed for the 
commission of such felony. 
18 U.S.C. sections 2113(a) and (d) 
(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or 
by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, 
from the person or presence of another any 
property or money or any other thing of value 
belonging to, or in the care, custody, 
control, management, or possession of, any 
bank, credit union, or any savings and loan 
association; or 
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any 
bank, credit union, or any savings and loan 
association, or any building used in whole or 
in part as a bank, credit union, or in such 
savings and loan association, or building, or 
part thereof, so used, any felony affecting 
such bank, credit union, or such savings and 
loan association and in violation of any 
statute of the United States, or any larceny 
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or 
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or 
both. 
• • • • 
(d) Whoever, in committing, or in 
attempting to commit, any offense defined in 
subsections (a) and (b) of this section, 
assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the 
life of any person by the use of a dangerous 
weapon or device, shall be fined not more 
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 
twenty-five years, or both. 
